Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games by Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders
Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance
Core, and Network Formation Games
Frank H. Page, Jr.∗
Department of Finance
University of Alabama
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
fpage@cba.ua.edu
Myrna H. Wooders†
Department of Economics
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN 37235
m.wooders@vanderbilt.edu
Current Version November, 2006‡
Abstract
Given the preferences of players and the rules governing network formation,
what networks are likely to emerge and persist? And how do individuals and
coalitions evaluate possible consequences of their actions in forming networks?
To address these questions we introduce a model of network formation whose
primitives consist of a feasible set of networks, player preferences, the rules of
network formation, and a dominance relation on feasible networks. The rules of
network formation may range from noncooperative, where players may only act
unilaterally, to cooperative, where coalitions of players may act in concert. The
dominance relation over feasible networks incorporates not only player prefer-
ences and the rules of network formation but also assumptions concerning the
degree of farsightedness of players. A speciﬁcation of the primitives induces an
abstract game consisting of (i) a feasible set of networks, and (ii) a path domi-
nance relation deﬁned on the feasible set of networks. Using this induced game
we characterize sets of network outcomes that are likely to emerge and persist.
Finally, we apply our approach and results to characterize the equilibrium of well
known models and their rules of network formation, such as those of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005).
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Overview of the questions, the model and the main results
In many economic and social situations the totality of interactions between individ-
uals and coalitions can be modeled as a network. We address the following question:
given preferences of individuals and rules governing network formation, what net-
works are likely to emerge and persist? To address this question we introduce a
model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of networks,
player preferences, the rules of network formation, and a dominance relation. The
rules of network formation may range from noncooperative, where players may only
act unilaterally, to cooperative, where coalitions consisting of multiple players may
act in concert. The dominance relation may be either direct or indirect. Under
direct dominance players are concerned with immediate consequences of their net-
work formation strategies whereas under indirect dominance players are farsighted
and consider the eventual consequences of their strategies. As we will discuss, our
framework can accommodate a wide variety of social and economic situations.
As p e c i ﬁcation of the primitives induces an abstract game consisting of (i) a
feasible set of networks and (ii) a path dominance relation deﬁned on the feasible
set of networks. Under the path dominance relation, a network G path dominates
another networkG  if there is a ﬁnite sequence of networks, beginning with G and
ending with G  where each network along the sequence dominates its predecessor.1
Using this induced abstract game as our basica n a l y t i ct o o lw ed e m o n s t r a t et h a tf o r
any set of primitives the following results hold:
1. The feasible set of networks contains a unique, ﬁnite, disjoint collection of
nonempty subsets each constituting a strategic basin of attraction.G i v e np r e f -
erences and the rules of governing network formation, these basins of attraction
are the absorbing sets of the process of network formation modeled via the
game.
2. A stable set (in the sense of von Neumann Morgenstern) with respect to path
dominance consists of one network from each basin of attraction.
3. The path dominance core, deﬁned as a set of networks having the property that
no network in the set is path dominated by any other feasible network, consists
of one network from each basin of attraction containing a single network. Note
that the path dominance core is contained in each stable set and is nonempty
1Stated formally, given feasible set of networks G and (a direct or indirect) dominance relation
>,n e t w o r kG
  ∈ G (weakly) path dominates network G ∈ G, written G
  ≥p G,i fG
  = G or if
there exists a ﬁnite sequence of networks {Gk}
n
k=0 in G with G = G0 and G
  = Gn such that for
k =1 ,2,...,n
Gk >G k−1.
The path dominance relation ≥p induced by the dominance relation > is sometimes referred to as
the transitive closure of >.
2if and only if there is a basin of attraction containing a single network.2 As
a corollary, we conclude that any network contained in the path dominance
core is Pareto eﬃcient. Thus, by considering the network formation game with
respect to path dominance— and thus by considering the long run - we identify
networks that are both stable and Pareto-eﬃcient with respect to the original
dominance relation.
4. From the above results it follows that if the dominance relation is transitive,
then the path dominance core is nonempty.
We also demonstrate specializations of our model to treat hedonic games and club
formation games and we discuss how our results apply to these examples.
There are interesting connections between our notions of stability (basins of at-
traction, path dominance stable sets, and path dominance core) and some of the
basic notions of stability and equilibrium found in the existing literature - such as,
strong stability (Jackson and van den Nouweland 2005), pairwise stability (Jackson
and Wolinsky 1996), consistency (Chwe 1994), and Nash equilibrium. We show that
in general (for all primitives) the path dominance core is contained in the set of
strongly stable networks. We conclude from our general results therefore that, for all
primitives, the existence of at least one basin of attraction containing a single network
is suﬃcient for the existence of a strongly stable network. We also demonstrate that,
depending on how we specialize the primitives of the model, the path dominance core
is equal to the set of strongly stable networks, the set of pairwise stable networks, or
the set of Nash networks.
Of particular interest are the connections between the rules of network formation,
the dominance relation inducing path dominance, and stability.3 We provide a uniﬁed
and systematic analysis of these connections. For example, we show that:
(a) If path dominance is induced by a direct dominance relation (as opposed to
an indirect dominance relation as in Chwe 1994, for example), then the path
dominance core is equal to the set of strongly stable networks.
(b) If, in addition, the rules of network formation are the Jackson-Wolinsky rules,
then the path dominance core is equal to the set of pairwise stable networks.4
(c) If path dominance is induced by a direct dominance relation and if the rules of
network formation only allow network changes brought about by individuals,
then the path dominance core is equal to the set of Nash networks.
2Put diﬀerently, the path dominance core is empty if and only if all basins of attraction contain
multiple networks.
3Although she treats a more specialized model, the questions addressed in Demange (2004) are
related.
4Under the Jackson-Wolinsky rules arc addition is bilateral (i.e., the two players that would be
involved in the arc must agree to adding the arc), arc subtraction is unilateral (i.e., at least one
player involved in the arc must agree to subtract or delete the arc), and network changes take place
one arc at a time (i.e., in any one play of the game, only one arc can be added or subtracted). See
section 3.2.1 for a formal deﬁnition.
3We then conclude from (3) above, the existence of at least one basin of attraction
containing a single network is, depending on how we specialize primitives, both nec-
essary and suﬃcient for either (i) the existence of a strongly stable network, or (ii) a
pairwise stable network, or (iii) a Nash network.5
When path dominance is induced by an indirect dominance relation as in Chwe
(1994), then we show that for all primitives - and in particular for all rules of network
formation - each strategic basin of attraction has a nonempty intersection with the
largest consistent set of networks (i.e., the Chwe set of networks, see Chwe 1994).6
This fact, together with (2) above, implies that there always exists a path dominance
stable set contained in the largest consistent set. Thus, the path dominance core is
contained in the largest consistent set. In light of our results on the path dominance
core and stability (both strong and pairwise), we conclude that if path dominance is
induced by an indirect dominance relation, then any network contained in the path
dominance core is not only consistent but also strongly stable, as well as pairwise
stable.7
We remark that solution concepts deﬁned using abstract dominance relations
have a distinguished history in the literature of game theory. First, consider the
von-Neuman-Morgenstern stable set. The vN-M stable set is deﬁned with respect to
an abstract dominance relation on a set of outcomes and consists of those outcomes
that are externally and internally stable with respect to the given dominance relation.
Similarly, Gilles (1959) deﬁnes the core based on a given abstract dominance relation.
These solution concepts, with a few exceptions, have typically been applied to models
of economies or cooperative games where the notion of dominance is based on what
a coalition can achieve using only the resources owned by its members (cf., Aumann
1964) or a given set of utility vectors for each possible coalition (cf., Scarf 1967).
Particularly notable exceptions are Schwartz (1974), Panzer, Kalai and Schmeidler
(1976), Kalai and Schmeidler (1977) and Shenoy (1980). Their motivations are in
part similar to ours in that they take as given a set of possible choices of a society and
a dominance relation and, based on these, describe a set of possible or likely social
outcomes called, by Kalai and Schmeidler, the admissible set. While their examples
treat direct dominance, their general results have wider applications. We return to a
discussion of the admissible set in our concluding section.
1.2 A further discussion of the model
In addition to introducing abstract games of network formation, our modeling ap-
proach contributes to the literature by extending the class of primitives used in the
5For Jackson-Wolinsky linking networks, Calvo-Armengol and Ilkilic (2004) provide necessary
and suﬃcient conditions on the network link marginal payoﬀs such that the set of pairwise stable,
pairwise Nash, and proper equilibrium networks coincide.
6Consistency with respect to indirect dominance and the notion of a largest consistent set were
introduced by Chwe (1994) in an abstract game setting. We provide a detailed discussion of Chwe’s
notion in Section 5.3.
7Other papers on indirect dominance and consistency in games include Xue (1998), Diamantoudi
and Xue (2003), and Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2003).
4analysis of network formation in three respects. These extensions, listed below, sig-
niﬁcantly broaden the set of potential applications.
1. Directed Networks with Heterogenous Arcs and Multiple Uses of the Same Arc:
First, we focus on directed networks rather than on linking networks8 and distinguish
between nodes and decision making players (i.e., the set of players and the set of
nodes are not necessarily the same).9 Connections are represented by arcs and each
arc possesses an orientation or direction: arc a connecting nodes i and i  must either
go from node i to node i  or must go from node i  to node i.10 For example, an
individual may have links on his web page to the web pages of all Nobel Laureates
in economics but it may be that no Nobel Laureate has a link to that individual’s
web page. Connections between nodes (i.e., arcs), besides having an orientation, are
allowed to be heterogeneous. To illustrate, if the nodes in a given network represent
players, an arc a going from player i to player i  might represent a particular type and
intensity of interaction (identiﬁed by the arc label a) initiated by player i towards
player i .P l a y e ri might direct great aﬀe c t i o nt o w a r dp l a y e ri
 
a sr e p r e s e n t e db ya r c
a, but player i
 
m a yd i r e c to n l yl u k e w a r ma ﬀection toward player i as represented
by arc a . Also, under our extended deﬁnition nodes are allowed to be connected by
multiple, distinct arcs. Thus, we allow nodes to interact in multiple, distinct ways.
For example, nodes i and i  m i g h tb ec o n n e c t e db ya r c sa and a , with arc a running
from node i to i  and arc a  running in the opposite direction (i.e., from node i  to
node i).11 If node i represents a seller and node i  a buyer, then arc a might represent
a contract oﬀer by the seller to the buyer, while arc a  might represent a counter oﬀer
or the acceptance or rejection of the contract oﬀer. Finally, loops are allowed and
arcs are allowed to be used multiple times in a given network.12 For example, arc a
might be used to connect nodes i and i  as well as nodes i  and i  . Thus, under our
deﬁnition nodes i and i  as well as nodes i  and i   are allowed to engage in the same
type of interaction as represented by arc a.
Allowing each type of arc to be used multiple times makes it possible to distinguish
coalitions by the type of interaction taking place between coalition members and to
give a network representation of such coalitions. For example, if the nodes in a given
network represent players, an ‘a-coalition’ could consist of all players i having an
a-connection with at least one other player i
 
. Such an a-coalition would then have a
network representation as the directed subnetwork consisting of pairs of nodes, i and
i
 
, connected by an a arc.
Until now, most of the economic literature on networks has focused on linking
networks (see Jackson 2005 for an excellent survey). In an undirected (or linking)
8In particular, we focus on the notion of directed networks introduced in Page, Wooders, and
Kamat (2005).
9Our example of club formation demonstrates a situation where the nodes are not necessarily
decision-making players. In particular, some nodes are club locations.
10We denote arc a going from node i to node i
  via the ordered pair (a,(i,i
 )),w h e r e(i,i
 ) is also
an ordered pair. Alternatively, if arc a goes from node i
  to node i,w ew r i t e(a,(i
 ,i)).
11Under our extended deﬁnition, arc a
  might also run in the same direction as arc a.H o w e v e r ,
our deﬁnition does not allow arc a to go from node i to node i
  multiple times.
12A loop is an arc going from ag i v e nn o d eto that same node. For example, given arc a and node
i, the ordered pair (a,(i,i)) i sal o o p .
5network, an arc (or link) is identiﬁed with a nonempty subset of nodes consisting
of exactly two distinct nodes, for example, {i,i },i = i . Thus, in an undirected
network, a link has no orientation and simply indicates a connection between two
players. Moreover, links are typically not distinguished by type (or by label) — that
is, links are homogeneous. By allowing arcs to possess direction and be used multiple
times and by allowing loops and nodes to be connected by multiple arcs, our deﬁnition
makes possible the application of networks to a rich set of economic environments. For
example, a job opportunity market model may embody the features introduced above;
individuals may have diﬀerent relationships with their superiors in an organization
and other individuals both within and outside of the organization. This may well
aﬀect social interactions and job opportunities.
2. The Rules of Network Formation: We explicitly model the rules of network forma-
tion and thus provide a systematic treatment of the relationship between rules and
stability. The rules of network formation specify which players must be involved in
adding, subtracting, or replacing an arc as well as how many and what types of arcs
can be added, subtracted, or replaced in any one play of the game.
In much of the literature, it is assumed (sometimes implicitly) that network for-
mation is governed by the Jackson-Wolinsky rules.13 Other rules are possible. For
example, the addition of an arc might require that a simple majority of the players
agree to the addition while the deletion of an arc might require that a two-thirds ma-
jority agree to the deletion. Under our approach, such rules are allowed. We achieve
this ﬂexibility by representing the rules of network formation via a collection of coali-
tional eﬀectiveness relations, {→S}S , deﬁned on the feasible set of networks. Given
feasible networks G and G ,i ft h er e l a t i o nG →S G  holds, the players in coalition S
can change network G to network G . In constructing our abstract game of network
formation, we will equip the feasible set of networks with a dominance relation which
incorporates - or represents - both the preferences of individuals and coalitions and
the rules of network formation as represented via the coalitional eﬀectiveness relations
{→S}S. Thus, the stability results we obtain using the path dominance relation will
reﬂect both preferences and rules.
3. The Dominance Relation Deﬁned on Feasible Networks: We allow the path domi-
nance relation on networks to be based on either direct dominance or indirect dom-
inance (direct and indirect dominance are formally deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n3 ) .A l lo fo u r
main results hold for both path dominance based on direct dominance and path
dominance based on indirect dominance.
13Jackson-van den Nouweland (2005) focus on linking networks and assume that link addition is
bilateral while link subtraction is unilateral. But in their model, network changes are not required to
take place one link at a time - multiple link changes can take place in any one play of the game. We
shall refer to these rules as the Jackson-van den Nouweland rules. Calvo-Armengol and Ilkilic (2004)
also focus on linking networks under bilateral-unilateral rules and allow multiple link changes.
61.3 Examples: club formation and hedonic games
To demonstrate the ﬂexibility of our approach as well as illustrate our notions of sta-
bility (i.e., basins of attraction, path dominance stable sets, and the path dominance
core), we consider two examples.
1.3.1 Club formation
Our ﬁrst example relates to a number of contributions in the literature, for example,
Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1998); we note other related literature in the pre-
sentation of the example. Our current formulation, taken from Page and Wooders
(2005, 2006), models club structures as bipartite networks and formulates the prob-
lem of club formation as a game of network formation. Under the assumption of free
mobility, where players can alter any existing club network by simply switching their
memberships, Page and Wooders (2006) consider two types of dominance relations
over club networks: direct dominance and indirect dominance. In our example we
compare core outcomes for path dominance with respect to direct dominance (i.e.,
direct core outcomes) to core outcomes for path dominance with respect to indirect
dominance (i.e., farsighted core outcomes).
In general, direct core outcomes diﬀer from farsighted core outcomes. For the
case where there are suﬃciently many club locations to allow for the partitioning
the total player set into clubs of optimal size with no left over players, the direct
and farsighted cores are equivalent and nonempty. However, if players are farsighted
(i.e., if path dominance is induced by indirect dominance), then the farsighted core
is nonempty if and only if there are no left over players - whereas the direct core is
nonempty, even if there are left over players, if and only if the payoﬀst op l a y e r si nt h e
left over club are greater than or equal to the payoﬀs that would be generated if the
left over players were to join clubs of optim a ls i z e( i . e . ,w e r et om a k eo p t i m a lc l u b s
overcrowded). Alternatively, if there are ‘too few’ club locations, so that the average
number of players per club is larger than the optimal club size, then the farsighted
core is nonempty if and only if players can be divided into clubs of equal size - whereas
the direct core is always nonempty and any club network in the direct core has clubs
of nearly equal size - i.e., clubs that diﬀer in size by at most one member. Moreover,
the set of club networks in the direct core coincides with the set of strongly stable
networks and the direct core induces the same set of partitions as the Nash club
equilibrium introduced in Arnold and Wooders (2005). This illustrates that (not
surprisingly) the degree of farsightedness captured by the dominance relation aﬀects
the size and content of the path dominance core. Stated loosely, the greater the
extent of the farsightedness, the smaller is the path dominance core.
If the rules of network formation allow only one player to move at a time (i.e., if
there is noncooperative free mobility), then the direct dominance core coincides with
the set of Nash networks (which coincides with the set of strongly stable networks).
This is true because only one player can move at a time and must be made better
oﬀ by changing the status quo. Some further characterizations are discussed in the
example.
71.3.2 Hedonic games
Our framework also encompasses hedonic games — games where players’ preferences
are deﬁned over the set of coalitions in which they are members. This is illustrated by
an interesting example proposed by Salvador Barbera and Michael Maschler in pri-
vate correspondence. The example also illustrates how, through indirect dominance,
outcomes in a game might move from one hedonic core point to another. From our
prior results, this demonstrates that, even though the hedonic core is nonempty, the
hedonic farsighted core is empty. We remark that a much more complete investigation
of indirect dominance for hedonic games appears in Diamantoudi and Xue (2003).
2 Directed Networks
2.1 The Deﬁnition
Let N be a ﬁnite set of nodes, with typical element denoted by i,a n dl e tA be a ﬁnite
set of arcs, with typical element denoted by a. Arcs represent potential connections
between nodes, and depending on the application, nodes can represent economic
players or economic objects such as markets or ﬁrms. The following deﬁnition is from
Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2001).
Deﬁnition 1 (Directed Networks)
Given node set N and arc set A, ad i r e c t e dn e t w o r k ,G, is a nonempty subset of
A×(N ×N). The collection of all directed networks is denoted by P(A×(N ×N)).
A directed network G ∈ P(A×(N×N)) speciﬁes how the nodes in N are connected
via the arcs in A. Note that in a directed network order matters. In particular, if
(a,(i,i
 
)) ∈ G, this means that arc a goes from node i to node i
 
. Also, note that
loops are allowed - that is, we allow an arc to go from a given node back to that given
node. For example, in a network model of journal citations loops could represent self-
cites.14 Finally, an arc can be used multiple times in a given network and multiple
arcs can go from one node to another. However, under our deﬁnition an arc a is not
allowed to go from a node i to a node i  multiple times.
The following notation is useful in describing changes in networks and the prop-
erties of networks. Given directed network G ∈ P(A × (N × N)),l e tG ∪ (a,(i,i ))
denote the network obtained by adding arc a from node i to node i  to network G,
and let G\(a,(i,i )) denote the network obtained by subtracting (or deleting) arc a
from node i to node i  from network G.A l s o ,l e t
G(a): =
 
(i,i
 
) ∈ N × N :( a,(i,i
 
)) ∈ G
 
,
and
G(i): =
 
a ∈ A : for some i  ∈ N either (a,(i,i
 
)) ∈ G or (a,(i ,i)) ∈ G
 
.

  
  
(1)
14This example was suggested by a participant at the Coalition Theory Network meeting held in
January 2006. Other examples could be developed. For example, in a network model of information
sharing, the fact that each player knows his own information would be represented by a loop.
8Thus, G(a) is the set of node pairs connected by arc a in network G,a n dG(i) is the
set of arcs going from node i or coming to node i in network G.
Note that if for some arc a ∈ A, G(a) is empty, then arc a i sn o tu s e di nn e t w o r k
G. Moreover, if for some node i ∈ N, G(i) is empty then node i i sn o tu s e di nn e t w o r k
G, and node i is said to be isolated relative to network G.
Suppose that the node set N is given by N = {i1,i 2,...,i 5}, w h i l et h ea r cs e tA
is given by A = {a1,a 2,...,a 5,a 6,a 7}. Consider network G in Figure 1.
i1
i2
i3
i4 i5
a1
a1
a2
a3
a1
a6
a5
a4
Figure 1: Network G
Note that in network G nodes i1 and i2 are connected by two a1 arcs running in oppo-
site directions and that nodes i1 and i3 are connected by two arcs, a1 and a3, running
in the same directions from node i3 to node i1.T h u s ,G(a1)={(i1,i 2),(i2,i 1),(i3,i 1)}
and G(a3)={(i3,i 1)}. Observe that (a6,(i4,i 4)) ∈ G is a loop. Thus, G(a6)=
{(i4,i 4)}. Also, observe that arc a7 i sn o tu s e di nn e t w o r kG.T h u s , G(a7)=∅.15
Finally, observe that G(i4)={a4,a 5,a 6},w h i l eG(i5)=∅. Thus, node i5 is isolated
relative to G.16
2.2 Linking Networks and Directed Graphs
Our notion of a directed network can be formally related to the notion of a linking
network. As before, let N denote a ﬁnite set of nodes. A linking network, say g,
consists of a ﬁnite collection of subsets of the form {i,i }, i  = i .T h u s , {i,i } ∈ g
means that nodes i and i  a r el i n k e di nn e t w o r kg. For example, g m i g h tb eg i v e n
by g = {{i,i },{i ,i   }} for i,i ,a n di   in N. Note that all connections or links are
the same (i.e., connection types are homogeneous), direction does not matter, and
15T h ef a c tt h a ta r ca7 i sn o tu s e di nn e t w o r kG can also be denoted by writing
a7 / ∈ projAG,
where projAG denotes the projection onto A of the subset
G ⊆ A × (N × N)
representing the network.
16If the loop (a7,(i5,i 5)) were part of network G in Figure 1, then node i5 would no longer be
considered isolated under our deﬁnition. Moreover, we would have G(i5)={a7}.
9loops are ruled out. Letting gN denote the collection of all subsets of N of size 2,
the collection of all linking networks given N is given by P(gN) where, recall, P(gN)
denotes the collection of all nonempty subsets of gN (e.g., see the deﬁnition in Jackson
and Wolinsky 1996).
A directed graph, say E,c o n s i s t so faﬁnite collection of ordered pairs (i,i ) ∈
N × N. For example, E m i g h tb eg i v e nb yE = {(i,i ),(i ,i  )} for (i,i ) and (i ,i  )
in N × N. Stated more compactly, a directed graph E is simply a subset of N × N.
Thus, in any directed graph connection types are again homogeneous but direction
does matter and loops are allowed.
Under our deﬁnition, a directed network G is a subset of A × (N × N),w h e r ea s
before A is a ﬁnite set of arcs. Thus, in a directed network, say G ∈ P(A × (N ×
N)), connection types are allowed to be heterogeneous (distinguished by arc labels),
direction matters, and loops are allowed.
3 Preferences, Rules, and Dominance Relations
3.1 Preferences
Let D denote the set of players (or economic decision making units) with typical
element denoted by d,a n dl e tP(D) denote the collection of all coalitions (i.e., non-
empty subsets of D) with typical element denoted by S. Note that, the set of players
D and the set of nodes N are not necessarily the same set.
Given a feasible set of directed networks G ⊆ P(A × (N × N)),w es h a l la s s u m e
that each player’s preferences over networks in G are speciﬁed via an irreﬂexive
binary relation  d.T h u s ,p l a y e r d ∈ D prefers network G  ∈ G to network G ∈ G
if G   d G and for all networks G ∈ G, G  d G (irreﬂexivity). Coalition S  ∈ P(D)
prefers network G  to network G, written G   S G,i fG   d G for all players d ∈ S .
In many applications, a player’s preferences are speciﬁed via a real-valued network
payoﬀ function, vd(·). For each player d ∈ D and each directed network G ∈ G,v d(G)
is the payoﬀ to player d in network G. Player d then prefers network G  to network
G if vd(G ) >v d(G). Moreover, coalition S  ∈ P(D) prefers network G  to network
G if vd(G ) >v d(G) for all d ∈ S . Note that the payoﬀ vd(G) to player d depends on
the entire network. Thus, the player may be aﬀected by directed links between other
players even when he himself has no direct or indirect connection with those players.
Intuitively, ‘widespread’ network externalities are allowed.
Remark 1 All of our results on basins of attraction, path dominance stable sets, and
the path dominance core (Theorems 1-4 below) remain valid even if coalitional pref-
erences { S}S∈P(D) over networks are based on weak preference relations {d}d∈D.
If G  d G then player d either strictly prefers G  to G (denoted G   d G)o ri s
indiﬀerent between G  and G (denoted G  ∼d G). Given weak preferences {d}d∈D,
coalition S  ∈ P(D) prefers network G  to network G,w r i t t e nG   S
  G, if for all
players d ∈ S , G  d G and if for at least one player d  ∈ S , G   d
  G.N o t e
that if coalitional preferences { S}S∈P(D) are deﬁned in this way (i.e., using weak
10preferences {d}d∈D), then they are irreﬂexive (i.e., G  S G for all G ∈ G and
S ∈ P(D)).
3.2 Rules
The rules of network formation are speciﬁed via a collection of coalitional eﬀectiveness
relations {→S}S∈P(D) deﬁn e do nt h ef e a s i b l es e to fn e t w o r k sG.E a c h e ﬀectiveness
relation →S represents what a coalition S can do. Thus, if G →S G  this means that
under the rules of network formation coalition S ∈ P(D) can change network G ∈ G
to network G  ∈ G by adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs in G.
3.2.1 Examples of Network Formation Rules
Jackson-Wolinsky Rules: To illustrate, consider Figure 2 depicting two networks G1
and G2 in which the nodes represent players. Thus, D = N = {i1,i 2,i 3}.
i1
i2
i3
a1
a1
a2
a3
Network G1
i1
i2
i3
a1
a1
a2
a3
a1
Network G2
Figure 2
Observe that
G2 = G1 ∪ (a1,(i3,i 1)) and G1 = G2\(a1,(i3,i 1)).
Assume that
(i) adding an arc a from player i to player i  requires that both players i and i  agree
to add arc a (i.e., arc addition is bilateral);
(ii) subtracting an arc a from player i to player i  requires that player i or player i 
agree to subtract arc a (i.e., arc subtraction is unilateral);
(iii) for any pair of networks G and G  in G,i fG →S G ,t h e nG  = G  and
either G  = G ∪ (a,(i,i )) for some (a,(i,i )) ∈ A × (N × N)
or
G  = G\(a,(i,i )) for some (a,(i,i )) ∈ A × (N × N).
11For the case D = N (i.e., players = nodes), we shall refer to rules (i)-(iii) above as
Jackson-Wolinsky rules. Note that rules (i) and (ii) imply that if G →S G ,t h e n
1 ≤ |S| ≤ 2. Referring to Figure 2, the eﬀectiveness relations over networks G and
G  under Jackson-Wolinsky rules are given by
G1 −→
{i1,i3}
G2 G2 −→
{i1,i3}
G1 G2 −→
{i1}
G1 G2 −→
{i3}
G1.
Jackson-van den Nouweland rules:C o n s i d e rn e t w o r k sG0 and G3 depicted in Figure
3 and again suppose that nodes represent players.
i1
i2
i3
a1
a1
a2
Network G0
i1
i2
i3
a1
a2
a3
a1
Network G3
Figure 3
Observe that
G3 =( G0\(a1,(i2,i 1))) ∪ (a1,(i3,i 1)) ∪ (a3,(i3,i 1))
and
G0 =( G3\((a1,(i3,i 1)) ∪ (a3,(i3,i 1)))) ∪ (a1,(i2,i 1)).
Assume that
(i) adding an arc a from player i to player i  requires that both players i and i  agree
to add arc a (i.e., arc addition is bilateral);
(ii) subtracting an arc a from player i to player i  requires that player i or player i 
agree to subtract arc a (i.e., arc subtraction is unilateral);
For the case D = N (i.e., players = nodes), we shall refer to rules (i)-(ii) above as
Jackson-van den Nouweland rules. Thus, the Jackson-van den Nouweland rules are
the Jackson-Wolinsky rules without the one-arc-at-a-time restriction. Note that if arc
addition is bilateral and arc subtraction is unilateral (i.e., if rules (i) and (ii) hold),
then G →S G  implies that G  is obtainable from G via coalition S,t h a ti s ,
(i) (a,(i,i )) ∈ G  and (a,(i,i )) / ∈ G
⇒ {i,i } ⊆ S;
(ii) (a,(i,i )) / ∈ G  and (a,(i,i )) ∈ G
⇒ {i,i } ∩ S  = ∅.
12Referring to Figure 3, the eﬀectiveness relations over networks G and G  under
Jackson-van den Nouweland rules are given by
G0 −→
{i1,i2,i3}
G3 G0 −→
{i1,i3}
G3 G3 −→
{i1,i2}
G0 G3 −→
{i1,i2,i3}
G0.
Noncooperative Rules: Now assume that
(i) adding an arc a from player i to player i  requires only that player i agree to add
the arc (i.e., arc addition is unilateral);
(ii) subtracting an arc a from node i to node i  requires only that player i agree to
subtract the arc (i.e., arc subtraction is unilateral);
(iii) G →S G  implies that |S| =1(i.e., only network changes are brought about by
individual players are allowed).
We shall refer to rules (i)-(iii) as noncooperative. Note that a player i can add or
subtract an arc to player i  without regard to the preferences of player i .
Under noncooperative rules, the eﬀectiveness relations over networks G1 and G2
in Figure 2 are given by
G1 −→
{i3}
G2 G1 −→
{i3}
G1.
Note that under noncooperative rules, networks G0 and G3 in Figure 3 are not related
under the eﬀectiveness relations
 
→{i}
 
i∈N. However, referring to the networks in
Figures 2 and 3, under the noncooperative rules we have, for example, the following
eﬀectiveness relations
G3 →{i2} G2 G2 →{i3} G0
and
G0 →{i3} G2 G2 →{i2} G3.
(1
2, 2
3)-Voting Rules: All of the rules above require that arc addition and arc subtrac-
tion involve at least one player who is a party to the arc. Consider now arc addition
and arc subtraction based on voting. If nodes represent players, then under certain
voting rules, arcs can be imposed on players. To see this, consider the following rules
for arc addition and arc subtraction.
(i) adding an arc a from player i to player i  requires a simple majority agree to add
arc a;
(ii) subtracting an arc a from player i to player i  requires a 2
3 majority agree to
subtract arc a;
(iii) for any pair of networks G and G  in G,i fG →S G ,t h e nG  = G  and
either G  = G ∪ (a,(i,i )) for some (a,(i,i )) ∈ A × (N × N)
or
G  = G\(a,(i,i )) for some (a,(i,i )) ∈ A × (N × N).
13We shall refer to rules (i)-(iii) above as (1
2, 2
3)-voting rules. Note that rules (i) and
(ii) imply that if G →S G ,t h e n
G →S G ∪ (a,(i,i )) for some (a,(i,i )) ∈ A × (N × N)
⇔
G ∪ (a,(i,i ))  S G and
|S|
|D| > 1
2;
and
G →S G\(a,(i,i )) for some (a,(i,i )) ∈ A × (N × N)
⇔
G\(a,(i,i ))  S G and
|S|
|D| > 2
3.
Referring to Figure 2, if players i2 and i3 prefer network G2 to network G1 while
player i1 prefers network G1 to network G2, then under (1
2, 2
3)-voting rules
G1 −→
{i2,i3}
G2,
where G2 = G1 ∪(a1,(i3,i 1)).T h u s ,a r ca1 from player i3 to player i1 is imposed on
player i1 under majority rule. Note that under (1
2, 2
3)-voting rules it is not possible
to move from network G2 back to network G1.
Nonuniform Rules and the Network Representation of Network Formation Rules:I n
all of the examples above, the rules for arc addition and arc subtraction are uniform
across pairs of networks. In some applications, such uniformity is not present. One
very concise way to write down such nonuniform network formation rules is to use a
network representation. In particular, suppose we write
(S,(G,G )) i fa n do n l yi fG →S G .
Thus, (S,(G,G )) if and only if under the rules coalition S ∈ P(D) can change
network G to network G . Letting the set of arcs be given by the collection of all
coalitions P(D) and letting the set of nodes be given by the feasible set of networks G,
the rules of network formation can be represented by a network G ⊂ P(D)×(G×G).
Then the set of all possible network formation rules is given by the set of all such
networks.
3.3 Dominance Relations
We will consider two types of dominance relations on the feasible set of networks
G ⊆ P(A × (N × N)), direct and indirect dominance.
3.3.1 Direct Dominance
Network G  ∈ G directly dominates network G ∈ G, sometimes written G  | G,i ff o r
some coalition S ∈ P(D),
G ≺S G 
and
G −→
S
G .
14Thus, network G  directly dominates network G if some coalition S prefers G  to G
and if under the rules of network formation coalition S has the power to change G
to G .
3.3.2 Indirect Dominance
Network G  ∈ G indirectly dominates network G ∈ G, written G  || G,i ft h e r ei sa
ﬁnite sequence of networks,
G0,G 1,...,G h,
with G = G0, G  = Gh, and Gk ∈ G for k =0 ,1,...,h,and a corresponding sequence
of coalitions,
S1,S 2,...,S h,
such that for k =1 ,2,...,h
Gk−1 −→
Sk
Gk,
and
Gk−1 ≺Sk Gh.
Note that if network G  indirectly dominates network G (i.e., if G  || G), then what
matters to the initially deviating coalition S1, as well as all the coalitions along the
way, is that the ultimate network outcome G  = Gh be preferred. Thus, for example,
the initially deviating coalition S1 will not be deterred from changing network G0 to
network G1 even if network G1 is not preferred to network G = G0,a sl o n ga st h e
ultimate network outcome G  = Gh is preferred to G0, that is, as long as G0 ≺S1 Gh.17
3.3.3 Path Dominance
Each dominance relation >, whether it be direct or indirect (i.e., whether >=| or
>=||), induces a path dominance relation on the set of networks. In particular,
corresponding to dominance relation > on networks G there is a corresponding path
dominance relation ≥p on G speciﬁed as follows: network G  ∈ G (weakly) path
dominates network G ∈ G with respect to > (i.e., with respect to the underlying
dominance relation >), written G  ≥p G,i fG  = G or if there exists a ﬁnite sequence
of networks {Gk}
h
k=0 in G with Gh = G  and G0 = G such that for k =1 ,2,...,h
Gk >G k−1.
We refer to such a ﬁnite sequence of networks as a ﬁnite domination path and we say
network G  is >-reachable from network G if there exists a ﬁnite domination path
from G to G .T h u s ,
G  ≥p G i fa n do n l yi f
 
G  is > -reachable from G,o r
G  = G.
(2)
17In order to capture the idea of farsightedness in strategic behavior, Chwe (1994) analyzes abstract
games equipped with indirect dominance relations in great detail, introducing the equilibrium notions
of consistency and largest consistent set. The basic idea of indirect dominance goes back to the work
of Guilbaud (1949) and Harsanyi (1974).
15If network G is reachable from network G,t h a ti s ,i ft h e r ei saﬁnite domination
path from G back to G then we call this path a circuit. Finally, if network G is not
reachable from any network in G and if no network in G is reachable from G,t h e n
network G is isolated (i.e., network G ∈ G is isolated if there does not exist a network
G  ∈ G with G  ≥p G or G ≥p G ).
3.3.4 The Directed Graph of a Dominance Relation
It is often useful to represent the dominance relation over networks using a directed
graph. For example, Figure 3 depicts the graph of dominance relation > on the
feasible set of networks G = {G0,G 1,...,G 7}.
G0
G2
G4
G2 G3 G2 G2 G5
G1 G6
G7 G2
Figure 4: Directed Graph of Dominance Relation >
The arrow (or >-arc) from network G3 to network G4 in Figure 4 indicates that G4
dominates G3. Given primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D) and given that > is a
direct dominance relation, the >-arc from network G3 to network G4 means that for
some coalition S, G4 is preferred to G3 and more importantly, that coalition S has
the power to change network G3 to network G4.T h u s ,G3 ≺S G4 and G3 →S G4.
But notice also that there is a >-arc in the opposite direction, from network G4
to network G3.T h u s , G3 also dominates G4, and thus for some other coalition S 
distinct from coalition S, that is, some coalition S  with S  ∩ S = ∅, G4 ≺S  G3 and
G4 →S  G3.
Note that network G3 is >-reachable from network G3 via two paths. Thus, the
graph of dominance relation > depicted in Figure 4 contains two circuits. Deﬁning
the length of a domination path to be the number of >-arcs in the path, these two
circuits are of length 4 and length 2.
Because networks G2 and G5 in Figure 4 are on the same circuit, G5 is >-reachable
from G2 and G2 is >-reachable from G5.T h u s ,G5 path dominates G2 (i.e., G5 ≥p
G2) and G2 path dominates G5 (i.e., G2 ≥p G5) .T h es a m ec a n n o tb es a i do fn e t w o r k s
16G1 and G5 in Figure 4. In particular, while G5 ≥p G1, it is not true that G1 ≥p G5
because G1 is not >-reachable from G5. Finally, note that network G0 is isolated.
4 Network Formation Games and Stability
We can now present our main results. Using the abstract network formation game
with respect to path dominance given by the pair
( G,≥p) (3)
and induced by primitives
(G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D) , (4)
we introduce and characterize the notions of (i) strategic basins of attraction, (ii)
path dominance stable sets, and (iii) the path dominance core. All of the results pre-
sented in this section hold for path dominance relations induced by direct dominance
relations or by indirect dominance relations.
4.1 Networks Without Descendants
If G1 ≥p G0 and G0 ≥p G1,n e t w o r k sG1 and G0 are equivalent, written G1 ≡p G0.
If networks G1 and G0 are equivalent then either networks G1 and G0 coincide or
G1 and G0 are on the same circuit (see Figure 4 above for a picture of a circuit). If
G1 ≥p G0 but G1 and G0 are not equivalent (i.e., not G1 ≡p G0), then network G1
is a descendant of network G0 and we write
G1 >p G0.( 5 )
Referring to Figure 4, observe that network G5 is a descendant of network G1,t h a t
is, G5 >p G1.
Network G  ∈ G has no descendants in G if for any network G ∈ G
G ≥p G  implies that G ≡p G .
Thus, if G  has no descendants then G ≥p G  implies that G and G  coincide or lie
on the same circuit.18
In attempting to identify those networks which are likely to emerge and persist,
networks without descendants are of particular interest. Here is our main result
concerning networks without descendants.
Theorem 1 (All path dominance network formation games have networks without
descendants)
Let (G,≥p) be a network formation game. For every network G ∈ G there exists
an e t w o r kG  ∈ G such that G  ≥p G and G  has no descendants.
18Note that any isolated network is by deﬁnition a network without descendants (e.g., network G0
in Figure 3).
17Proof. Let G0 be any network in G.I f G0 has no descendants then we are done.
If not choose G1 such that G1 >p G0.I f G1 has no descendants then we are done.
If not, continue by choosing G2 >p G1. Proceeding iteratively, we can generate a
sequence, G0,G 1,G 2,....Now observe that in a ﬁnite number of iterations we must
come to a network Gk  without descendants. Otherwise, we could generate an inﬁnite
sequence, {Gk}k such that for all k,
Gk >p Gk−1.
However, because G is ﬁnite this sequence would contain at least one network, say Gk ,
which is repeated an inﬁnite number of times. Thus, all the networks in the sequence
lying between any two consecutive repetitions of Gk  w o u l db eo nt h es a m ec i r c u i t ,
contradicting the fact that for all k, Gk is a descendant of Gk−1 (i.e., Gk >p Gk−1).
By Theorem 1, in any network formation game (G,≥p), corresponding to any
network G ∈ G there is a network G  ∈ G without descendants which is >-reachable
from G. Thus, in any network formation game the set of networks without descen-
dants is nonempty. Referring to Figure 4, the set of networks without descendants is
given by
{G0,G 2,G 3,G 4,G 5,G 7}.
We shall denote by Z the set of networks without descendants.
4.2 Basins of Attraction
Stated loosely, a basin of attraction is a set of equivalent networks to which the
strategic network formation process represented by the game might tend and from
which there is no escape. Formally, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 (Basin of Attraction)
Let (G,≥p) be a network formation game. A set of networks A ⊆ G is said to be
a basin of attraction for (G,≥p) if
1. the networks contained in A are equivalent (i.e., for all G  and G in A, G  ≡p G)
and for no set A  having A as a strict subset is this true that all the networks
in A  are equivalent,19 and
2. no network in A has descendants (i.e., there does not exist a network G  ∈ G
such that G  >p G for some G ∈ A).
As the following characterization result shows, there is a very close connection
between networks without descendants and basins of attraction.
Theorem 2 (A characterization of basins of attraction)
Let (G,≥p) be a network formation game and let A be a subset of networks in G.
The following statements are equivalent:
19A i sas t r i c ts u b s e to fA
  if
A ⊂ A
  and A
 \A  = ∅.
181. A is a basin of attraction for (G,≥p).
2. There exists a network without descendants, G ∈ Z, such that
A =
 
G  ∈ Z : G  ≡p G
 
.
Proof. (1) implies (2): Because the sets A and {G  ∈ Z : G  ≡p G}, G ∈ Z,a r e
equivalence classes, A  ={G  ∈ Z : G  ≡p G} implies that
A∩
 
G  ∈ Z : G  ≡p G
 
= ∅ for all G ∈ Z.
Thus, if (2) fails, this implies that A contains a network with descendants. Thus, A
cannot be a basin of attraction for (G,≥p), and thus, (1) implies (2).20
(2) implies (1): Suppose now that
A =
 
G  ∈ Z : G  ≡p G
 
for some network G ∈ Z.I f A is not a basin of attraction, then for some network
G   ∈ G, G   >p G  for some G  ∈ A. But now G   >p G  and G  ≡p G imply that
G   >p G, contradicting the fact that G ∈ Z. Thus, (2) implies (1).
In light of Theorem 2, we conclude that in any network formation game (G,≥p), G
contains a unique, ﬁnite, disjoint collection of basins of attraction, say {A1,A2,...,Am},
where for each k =1 ,2,...,m(m ≥ 1)
Ak = AG :=
 
G  ∈ Z : G  ≡p G
 
for some network G ∈ Z. Note that for networks G  and G in Z such that G  ≡p G,
AG  = AG (i.e. the basins of attraction AG  and AG coincide). Also, note that if
network G ∈ G is isolated, then G ∈ Z and
AG :=
 
G  ∈ Z : G  ≡p G
 
= {G}
is, by deﬁnition, a basin of attraction - but a very uninteresting one.
Example 1 (Basins of attraction)
In Figure 4 above the set of networks without descendants is given by
Z = {G0,G 2,G 3,G 4,G 5,G 7}.
Even though there are six networks without descendants, because networks G2,G 3,G 4,
and G5 are equivalent, there are only three basins of attraction:
A1 = {G0}, A2 = {G2,G 3,G 4,G 5},a n dA3 = {G7}.
Moreover, because G2,G 3,G 4,a n dG5 are equivalent,
AG2 = AG3 = AG4 = AG5 = {G2,G 3,G 4,G 5}.
20Note that if G ∈ Z and G
  ≡p G,t h e nG
  ∈ Z.
194.3 Stable Sets with Respect to Path Dominance
The formal deﬁnition of a ≥p-stable set is as follows.21
Deﬁnition 3 (Stable Sets with Respect to Path Dominance)
Let (G,≥p) be a network formation game. A subset V of networks in G is said to
be a stable set for (G,≥p) if
(a) (internal ≥p -stability) whenever G0 and G1 are in V,w i t hG0  = G1,t h e n
neither G1 ≥p G0 nor G0 ≥p G1 hold, and
(b) (external ≥p -stability) for any G0 / ∈ V there exists G1 ∈ V
such that G1 ≥p G0.
In other words, a nonempty subset of networks V is a stable set for (G,≥p) if
G0 and G1 are in V,w i t hG0  = G1,t h e nG1 is not reachable from G0,n o ri sG0
reachable from G1,a n di fG0 / ∈ V, then there exists G1 ∈ V reachable from G0.
We now have our main results on the existence, construction, and cardinality of
stable sets.22
Theorem 3 (Stable sets: existence, construction, and cardinality)
Let (G,≥p) be a network formation game, and without loss of generality assume
that (G,≥p) has basins of attraction given by
{A1,A2,...,Am},
where basin of attraction Ak contains |Ak| many networks (i.e., |Ak| is the cardinality
of Ak). Then the following statements are true:
1. V ⊆ G is a stable set for (G,≥p) if and only if V is constructed by choosing one
network from each basin of attraction, that is, if and only if V is of the form
V = {G1,G 2,...,G m},
where Gk ∈ Ak for k =1 ,2,...,m.
2. (G,≥p) possesses
|A1|·| A2|·····| Am| := M
many stable sets and each stable set, Vq, q =1 ,2,...,M, has cardinality
|Vq| = |{A1,A2,...,Am}| = m.
21By equipping the abstract network formation game with the path dominance relation rather
than the original dominance relation, we entirely avoid the famous Lucas (1968) example of a game
with no stable set.
22These results can be viewed as applications of some classical results from graph theory to the
theory of network formation games (e.g., see Berge 2001, Chapter 2).
20Proof. It suﬃces to prove (1). Given (1), the proof of (2) is straightforward. To
begin, let
V = {G1,G 2,...,G m},
where Gk ∈ Ak for k =1 ,2,...,m, and suppose that for Gk and Gk  in V, Gk  ≥p Gk.
Since Gk ∈ Ak has no descendants, this would imply that Gk  ≡p Gk.B u tt h i si sa
contradiction because Gk ∈ Ak and Gk  ∈ Ak  and the basins of attraction Ak and
Ak  are disjoint. Thus, V is internally ≥p-stable. Now suppose that network G is not
contained in V. By Theorem 1, there exists a network G  ∈ G without descendants
such that G  ≥p G. By Theorem 2, G  is contained in some basin of attraction Ak
and therefore G  ≡p Gk where Gk is the kth component of {G1,G 2,...,G m}.T h u s ,
we have Gk ≥p G  ≥p G implying that Gk ≥p G, and thus V is externally ≥p-stable.
Suppose now that V ⊆ G is a stable set for (G,≥p). First note that each network
G in V is a network without descendants. Otherwise there exists G  ∈ G\V such that
G  >p G. But then because V is externally ≥p-stable, there exists G   ∈ V, G    = G,
such that G   ≥p G  implying that G   ≥p G and contradicting the internal ≥p-
stability of V. Because each G ∈ V is without descendants, it follows from Theorem
2t h a te a c hG ∈ V is contained in some basin of attraction Ak. Moreover, because V is
internally ≥p-stable and because all networks contained in any one basin of attraction
are equivalent, no two distinct networks contained in V can be contained in the same
basin of attraction. It only remains to show that for each basin of attraction, Ak,
k =1 ,2,...,m,
V ∩ Ak  = ∅.
Suppose not. Then for some k , V ∩ Ak  = ∅. Because all networks in Ak  are without
descendants, for no network G ∈ Ak  is it true that there exists a network G  ∈ V
such that G  ≥p G. Thus, we have a contradiction of the external ≥p-stability of V.
Example 2 (Basins of attraction and stable sets)
Referring to Figure 4, it follows from Theorem 3 that because
|A1|·| A2|·| A3| =1· 4 · 1=4 ,
the network formation game (G,≥p) has 4 stable sets, each with cardinality 3. By
examining Figure 4 in light of Theorem 3, we see that the stable sets for (G,≥p) are
given by
V1 = {G0,G 2,G 7},
V2 = {G0,G 3,G 7},
V3 = {G0,G 4,G 7},
V4 = {G0,G 5,G 7}.
4.4 The Path Dominance Core
Deﬁnition 4 (The Path Dominance Core)
Let (G,≥p) be a network formation game. A subset C of networks in G is said to
be the path dominance core of (G,≥p) if for each network G ∈ C there does not exist
an e t w o r kG  ∈ G, G   = G,s u c ht h a tG  ≥p G.
21Our next results give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the path dominance
core of a network formation game to be nonempty, as well as a recipe for constructing
the path dominance core.
Theorem 4 (Path dominance core: nonemptiness and construction)
Let (G,≥p) be a network formation game, and without loss of generality assume
that (G,≥p) has basins of attraction given by
{A1,A2,...,Am},
where basin of attraction Ak contains |Ak| many networks. Then the following state-
ments are true:
1. (G,≥p) has a nonempty path dominance core if and only if there exists a basin
of attraction containing a single network, that is, if and only if for some basin
of attraction Ak, |Ak| =1 .
2. Let
{Ak1,Ak2,...,Akn} ⊆ {A1,A2,...,Am},
be the subset of basins of attraction containing all basins having cardinality 1.
Then the path dominance core C of (G,≥p) is given by
C = {Gk1,G k2,...,G kn},
where Gki ∈ Aki,f o ri =1 ,2,...,n.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that a network G is contained in the path dominance
core C if and only if G ∈ Ak for some basin of attraction Ak, k =1 ,2,...,m,w i t h
|Ak| =1 . First note that if G is in the path dominance core, then G is a network
without descendants. Thus, G ∈ Ak for some basin of attraction Ak.I f |Ak| > 1,
then there exists another network G  ∈ Ak such that G  ≡p G.T h u s , G  ≥p G
contradicting the fact that G is in the path dominance core. Conversely, if G ∈ Ak
for some basin of attraction Ak with |Ak| =1 , then there does not exist a network
G   = G such that G  ≥p G.
Remark 2 If coalitional preferences { S}S∈P(D) over networks are based on weak
preference relations {d}d∈D rather than on strong preference relations { d}d∈D (see
Remark 1 above), then the corresponding path dominance core - the weak path domi-
nance core - is contained in the path dominance core (i.e., the path dominance core
based on strong preference relations).
Example 3 (Basins of attraction and the path dominance core)
It follows from Theorem 4 that the path dominance core of the network formation
game (G,≥p) with feasible set
G = {G0,G 1,...,G 7}
22and path dominance relation ≥p induced by the dominance relation depicted in Figure
4i s
C = {G0,G 7}.
Figure 5 contains the graph of a diﬀerent dominance relation on G = {G0,G 1,...,G 7}.
G0
G2
G4
G2 G3 G2 G2 G5
G1 G6
G7 G2
Figure 5: Graph of a diﬀerent dominance relation  
Denoting the new dominance relation by  ,the network formation game
 
G, p
 
with
respect to the path dominance relation  p induced by the dominance relation   has
3c i r c u i t sa n d2b a s i n so fa t t r a c t i o n ,
A1={G2,G 3,G 4,G 5} and A2={G6,G 7}.
Because |A1| =4and |A2| =2 , by Theorem 4 the path dominance core of
 
G, p
 
is empty. By Theorem 3,
 
G, p
 
has 8 stable sets each containing 2 networks (i.e.,
each with cardinality 2). These stable sets are given by
V1 = {G2,G 6},
V2 = {G3,G 6},
V3 = {G4,G 6},
V4 = {G5,G 6},
V5 = {G2,G 7},
V6 = {G3,G 7},
V7 = {G4,G 7},
V8 = {G5,G 7}.
4.4.1 The Path Dominance Core and Pareto Eﬃciency
Given primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D), we say that a network G ∈ G is Pareto
eﬃcient if there does not exist another network G  ∈ G such that (i) G →S G  for
23some coalition S ∈ P(D) and (ii) G ≺d G  for all players d ∈ D.L e tE denote the
set of Pareto eﬃcient networks and let C denote the path dominance core of network
formation game (G,≥p). It is easy to see that C ⊆ E.
5 Other Stability Notions for Network Formation Games
5.1 Strongly Stable Networks
W eb e g i nw i t haf o r m a ld e ﬁnition of strong stability for abstract network formation
games.
Deﬁnition 5 (Strong Stability)
Given primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D) and network formation game (G,≥p),
network G ∈ G is said to be strongly stable in (G,≥p) if for all G  ∈ G and S ∈ P(D),
G →S G
 
implies that G ⊀S G
 
.
Thus, a network is strongly stable if whenever a coalition has the power to change
the network to another network, the coalition will be deterred from doing so because
not all members of the coalition are made better oﬀ by such a change.23 If nodes
represent players and arc addition is bilateral while arc subtraction is unilateral, then
our deﬁnition of strong stability is essentially that of Jackson-van den Nouweland but
for directed networks rather than linking networks. Note that under our deﬁnition
of strong stability a network G ∈ G that cannot be changed to another network by
any coalition is strongly stable.
We now have our main result on the path dominance core and strong stability.
Denote the set of strongly stable networks by SS.
Theorem 5 (The path dominance core and strong stability)
Given primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D) and network formation game (G,≥p),
the following statements are true.
1. If the path dominance core C of (G,≥p) is nonempty, then SS is nonempty and
C ⊆ SS.
2. If the dominance relation > underlying ≥p is a direct dominance relation, then
C = SS and SS is nonempty if and only if there exists a basin of attraction
containing a single network.
Proof. 1. Let C ⊆ G, C  = ∅, be the path dominance core of (G,≥p) and let network
G be contained in C. Then there does not exist a network G  ∈ G, G   = G, such that
G  ≥p G. If for some coalition S and some network G  ∈ G, G →S G  and G ≺S G ,
23Our deﬁnition of a strongly stable network diﬀers slightly from the deﬁnition given in Jackson-van
den Nouweland (2005). In particular, under their deﬁnition, a network is strongly stable if whenever
a coalition has the power to change the network to another network, the coalition will be deterred
from doing so because at least one member of the coalition is made worse oﬀ by the change.
24then G  ≥p G trivially, a contradiction. Thus, for G contained in C, G →S G  for
coalition S implies that G ⊀S G
 
, and thus G ∈ C implies G ∈ SS.
2. To see that SS ⊆ C if the dominance relation > underlying ≥p is a direct
dominance relation, consider the following. If G/ ∈ C, then there exists a network
G   = G which path dominates G,t h a ti s ,G  ≥p G. This implies that there exists
an e t w o r kG   such that G  ≥p G   >G . Because > is a direct dominance relation,
for some coalition S we have G →S G   and G ≺S G  .T h u s , G/ ∈ SS.B y p a r t 1
of Theorem 4, C = SS is nonempty if and only if there exists a basin of attraction
containing a single network.
Note that the set of strongly stable networks is contained in the set of Pareto
eﬃcient networks. Thus, C ⊆ SS ⊆ E.
5 . 2 P a i r w i s eS t a b l eN e t w o r k s
The following deﬁnition is a formalization of Jackson-Wolinsky (1996) pairwise sta-
bility for abstract network formation games.
Deﬁnition 6 (Pairwise Stability)
Given networks P(A×(N ×N)) where nodes represent players (i.e., N = D)a n d
given feasible networks G ⊆ P(A×(N×N)) and primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D),
network G ∈ G is said to be pairwise stable in network formation game (G,≥p) if for
all (a,(i,i )) ∈ A × (N × N),
1. G →{i,i } G ∪ (a,(i,i )) implies that G ⊀{i,i } G ∪ (a,(i,i ));
2. (a) G →{i} G (a,(i,i )) implies that G ⊀{i} G (a,(i,i )),a n d
(b) G →{i } G (a,(i,i )) implies that G ⊀{i } G (a,(i,i )).
Thus, a network is pairwise stable if there is no incentive for any pair of players
to add an arc to the existing network and there is no incentive for any player who
is party to an arc in the existing network to dissolve or remove the arc. Note that
under our deﬁnition of pairwise stability a network G ∈ G that cannot be changed to
another network by any coalition, or can only be changed by coalitions of size greater
than 2, is pairwise stable.
Let PS denote the set of pairwise stable networks. It follows from the deﬁnitions
of strong stability and pairwise stability that SS ⊆ PS. Moreover, if the full set of
Jackson-Wolinsky rules are in force, then SS = PS.
We now have our main result on the path dominance core and pairwise stability.
Theorem 6 (The path dominance core and pairwise stability)
Given primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D) where nodes represent players (i.e.,
N = D) and given network formation game (G,≥p), the following statements are
true.
1. If the path dominance core C of (G,≥p) is nonempty, then PS is nonempty and
C ⊆ PS.
252. If the dominance relation > underlying ≥p is a direct dominance relation and if
the Jackson-Wolinsky rules hold, then C = PS and PS is nonempty if and only
if there exists a basin of attraction containing a single network.
Proof. The proof of part 1 follows from part 1 of Theorem 5 and the fact that
SS ⊆ PS. For the proof of part 2, note that under the Jackson-Wolinsky rules
SS = PS.T h u s , w e h a v e C ⊆ SS = PS. If in addition the path dominance relation
is induced by a direct dominance relation, then we have PS = SS ⊆ C.T h u s ,i ft h e
path dominance is induced by a direct dominance and if the Jackson-Wolinsky rules
hold, then we have C = SS = PS. By part 1 of Theorem 4, C = SS = PS is nonempty
if and only if there exists a basin of attraction containing a single network.
Theorem 6 can be viewed as an extension of a result due Jackson and Watts (2002)
on the existence of pairwise stable linking networks for network formation games
induced by Jackson-Wolinsky rules. In particular, Jackson and Watts (2002) show
that for this particular class of Jackson-Wolinsky network formation games, if there
does not exist a closed cycle of networks, then there exists a pairwise stable network.
Our notion of a strategic basin of attraction containing multiple networks corresponds
to their notion of a closed cycle of networks. Thus, stated in our terminology, Jackson
and Watts show that for this class of network formation games, if there does not exist
a basin of attraction containing multiple networks, then there exists a pairwise stable
network. Following our approach, if we specialize to this class of Jackson-Wolinsky
network formation games, then by part 2 of Theorem 6 the existence of at least one
strategic basin containing a single network is both necessary and suﬃcient for the
existence of a pairwise stable network.
5.3 Consistent Networks
W eb e g i nw i t haf o r m a ld e ﬁnition of farsighted consistency (Chwe 1994).
Deﬁnition 7 (Consistent Sets)
Let (G,≥p) be a network formation game where path dominance ≥p is induced by
an indirect dominance relation ||. A subset F of directed networks in G is said to
be consistent in (G,≥p) if
for all G0 ∈ F,
G0 →S1 G1 for some G1 ∈ G and some coalition S1 implies that
there exists G2 ∈ F
with G2 = G1 or G2 || G1 such that,
G0 ⊀S1 G2.
In words, a subset of directed networks F is said to be consistent in (G,≥p) if
given any network G0 ∈ F a n da n yd e v i a t i o nt on e t w o r kG1 ∈ G by coalition S1 (via
adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs in accordance with eﬀectiveness relations →S),
there exists further deviations leading to some network G2 ∈ F where the initially
deviating coalition S1 is not better oﬀ - and possibly worse oﬀ.An e t w o r kG ∈ G is
said to be consistent if G ∈ F where F is a consistent set in (G,≥p).T h e r ec a nb e
26many consistent sets in (G,≥p). We shall denote by F∗ is largest consistent set (or
simply, the largest consistent set). Thus, if F is a consistent set, then F ⊆ F∗.
We now have our main result on the relationship between basins of attraction,
stable sets, the path dominance core, and the largest consistent set.
Theorem 7 (Basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and the largest consis-
tent set)
Given primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D) and given network formation game
(G,≥p),where path dominance is induced by an indirect dominance relation ||,a s -
sume without loss of generality that (G,≥p) has nonempty largest consistent set given
by F∗ and basins of attraction given by
{A1,A2,...,Am}.
Then the following statements are true:
1. Each basin of attraction Ak, k =1 ,2,...,m, has a nonempty intersection with
the largest consistent set F∗, that is
F∗ ∩ Ak  = ∅, for k =1 ,2,...,m.
2. If (G,≥p) has a nonempty path dominance core C,t h e n
C ⊆ F∗.
Proof. In light of Theorem 4, (2) easily follows from (1). Thus, it suﬃces to prove
(1). Suppose that for some basin of attraction Ak 
F∗ ∩ Ak  = ∅.
Let G  be a network in Ak .B e c a u s e F∗ is externally stable with respect to the
indirect dominance relation ||, G  / ∈ F∗ implies that there exists some network
G∗ ∈ F∗ such that G∗ || G .T h u s , G∗ ≥p G . Because the networks in Ak  are
without descendants, it must be true that G  ≥p G∗. But this implies that G∗ ≡p G ,
and therefore that G∗ ∈ Ak , a contradiction.
Remark 3 Recently, Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2005) introduced a no-
tion of pairwise farsighted stability. If in our model coalitional preferences { S
}S∈P(D) over networks are based on weak preference relations {d}d∈D (see Remark
1 above), if nodes represent players (i.e., N = D), and if the dominance relation un-
derlying the path dominance relation is indirect, then under Jackson-Wolinsky rules
the corresponding weak path dominance core is contained in the set of pairwise far-
sightedly stable networks.
275.4 Nash Networks
Deﬁnition 8 (Nash Networks)
Given primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D) and network formation game (G,≥p),
network G ∈ G is said to be a Nash network in (G,≥p) if for all G  ∈ G and S ∈ P(D)
such that |S| =1,G→S G
 
implies that G ⊀S G
 
.
Thus, a network is Nash if whenever an individual player has the power to change
the network to another network, the player will have no incentive to do so. We
shall denote by NE the set of Nash networks. Note that our deﬁnition of a Nash
network does not require that the network formation rules, as represented via the
eﬀectiveness relations {→S}S∈P(D), be noncooperative (see subsection 3.2.1). Also,
note that under our deﬁnition any network that cannot be changed to another network
by a coalition of size 1 is a Nash network. Finally, note that the set of strongly stable
networks SS i sc o n t a i n e di nt h es e to fN a s hn e t w o r k sNE.
We now have our main result on the path dominance core and strong stability.
Theorem 8 (The path dominance core and Nash networks)
Given primitives (G,{ S},{→S},>)S∈P(D) and network formation game (G,≥p),
the following statements are true.
1. If the path dominance core C of (G,≥p) is nonempty, then NE is nonempty and
C ⊆ NE.
2. If the dominance relation > underlying ≥p is a direct dominance relation and if
the rules of network formation are such that G →S G
 
implies that |S| =1 ,t h e n
C = NE and NE is nonempty if and only if there exists a basin of attraction
containing a single network.
Proof. The proof of part 1 follows from part 1 of Theorem 5 and the fact that
SS ⊆ NE. For the proof of part 2, note that if the rules of network formation are
such that G →S G
 
implies that |S| =1 ,t h e nSS = NE. Thus, we have C ⊆ SS = NE.
If in addition the path dominance relation is induced by a direct dominance relation,
then we have NE = SS ⊆ C, and we conclude that C = SS = NE.T h u s ,i ft h ep a t h
dominance is induced by a direct dominance and if the rules are such that G →S
G
 
implies that |S| =1 ,t h e nw eh a v eC = SS = NE. By part 1 of Theorem 4,
C = SS = NE is nonempty if and only if there exists a basin of attraction containing
as i n g l en e t w o r k .
We close this section by noting that if the dominance relation > underlying ≥p
is a direct dominance relation and if the rules of network formation are such that
G →S G
 
implies that |S| =1 , then the set of Nash networks NE i sc o n t a i n e di nt h e
set of Pareto eﬃcient networks E.T h u s ,f o rt h i sc a s ew eh a v eC = SS = NE ⊆ E.
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6.1 Club Networks
In this section, as an application of our approach to network formation, we consider
club formation games. Following Page and Wooders (2005, 2006), we model club
structures as bipartite networks and formulates the problem of club formation as a
game of network formation. There are a number of models in the literature that use
s o m eo ft h es a m es p e c i ﬁcation of primitives. Our club network model can be viewed as
a network version of the local public good games analyzed by, among others, Konishi,
Le Breton and Weber (1997a, 1998). In a classic paper, Rosenthal (1973) proves the
existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a class of games closely related to the
club network formation game we consider here. More recently, Konishi et al. (1997a),
and, for an even more general model including external eﬀects of group formation
on non—members, Hollard (2000), prove existence of Nash equilibrium when players
unilaterally chose clubs. Holzman and Law—Yone (1997), Konishi et al. (1997b), and
Milchtaich (1996) are concerned with the special case of congestion games, where each
player’s payoﬀ is non—increasing in the number of players choosing the same strategy
as himself. The latter two articles also provide conditions for the existence of strong
Nash equilibria. Club games with positive externalities are analyzed in Konishi et al.
(1997b).
For noncooperative network formation rules, the setup of our model is closely
related to the model of Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1997a). They deﬁne a free
mobility equilibrium of a local public goods economy as an assignment of players to
clubs (locations, or jurisdictions) that partitions the population and has the property
that no individual can gain by either moving to any other existing club, or creating
his own club.24 The partition derived from the players’ strategy choices is thus stable
against unilateral deviations by individuals. For our club network model, one possible
speciﬁcation of the rules of the game is to allow only individual deviations and it is for
this speciﬁcation that our model most closely resembles that of Konishi, Le Breton
and Weber (1997a).
For a speciﬁcation of the rules of network formation that allows all subsets of de-
cision makers to form coalitions and act in concert, our model is also closely related
to models of economies with clubs or local public goods as in, for example, Conley
and Wooders (2001) and papers cited therein, that study both price-taking equilib-
rium and the core of the cooperative game derived from their underlying economic
principles. When there are ‘enough’ clubs, our model is closely related to the partic-
ular case, treated in Wooders (1980) and other papers, where crowding is anonymous
(that is, only club size is relevant and not the characteristics of club members) but
is more restrictive in that in our model, all players have identical preferences.25
Since we allow coalitional moves, our research is also related to Arnold and Wood-
24Such an equilibrium is sometimes called a free entry equilibrium.
25A possible modiﬁcation of the model is to allow multiple types of players — heterogeneous play-
ers. With such a modiﬁcation, we could then examine additional questions, for example, whether
equilibrium club networks generate homogenous clubs.
29ers (2005), who consider a dynamic formulation of a game arising from the same sort
of primitives as described below. Arnold and Wooders restrict coalitions to subsets
of members of clubs, but also show the set of ‘Nash club equilibrium’ outcomes is
equivalent to the set of strong equilibrium outcomes.
Overall, our club example illustrates several relationships between concepts shown
in this paper and also indicates the importance of the network formation rules and the
nature of the dominance relation (direct or indirect) in determining the equilibrium
which emerges from the process of network formation represented by the game. In
the case of ‘too few’ clubs, our example also highlights that our model and results
cannot be presented in the framework of cooperative games or hedonic games. With
too few clubs, a group of players larger than a singleton can only ensure themselves
the worst possible outcome, the outcome which is least preferred.
6.1.1 Basic Ingredients and Assumptions
Let D be a ﬁnite set of players with typical element denoted by i and let C be a
ﬁnite set of club types - or alternatively, a set of club labels or club locations - with
typical element denoted by c. Assume that the set of nodes is given by N = D ∪ C,
while the set of arcs is given by a singleton, A = {1}. The set of all club networks
consists of the collection of all nonempty subsets of A×(D×C), a collection denoted
by P(A × (D × C)).N o t et h a tP(A × (D × C)) is a subset of P(A × (N × N)).F o r
a n yc l u bn e t w o r kG ∈ P(A × (D × C))
(1,(i,c)) ∈ G means that player i is a member of club c.
Given club network G ∈ P(A × (D × C)),
G(c): ={i ∈ D :( 1 ,(i,c)) ∈ G}
(i.e., the section of G at c) is the set of members of club c in network G,w h i l et h e
set
G(i): ={c ∈ C :( 1 ,(i,c)) ∈ G}
(i.e., the section of G at i) is the set of clubs to which player i belongs in network G.
We shall maintain the following assumptions throughout:
A-1 (single club membership) The feasible set of club networks, G ⊂P(A×(D×C)),
is given by
G := {G ∈ P(A × (D × C)) : |G(i)| =1for all i ∈ D}.
Thus, in each feasible club network G ∈ G each player is a member of one and
only one club. Note that under assumption [A-1] the collection {G(c):c ∈ C}
forms a partition of the set of players.
30A-2 (identical payoﬀ functions depending on club size) Players have identical payoﬀ
functions, u(·) and payoﬀs are a function of club size only. In general, given any
club network G,
   G2(i)
    denotes the total number of club members in the club to
which player i belongs in network G. In particular, G(i)=c denotes the single
club to which player i belongs and G(G(i)) := G2(i) is the set of members of the
club to which player i belongs. Thus,
   G2(i)
    is the total number of members
in the club to which player i belongs in club network G and
u(
   G2(i)
   )= the payoﬀ to player i in club network G.
A-3 (single-peaked payoﬀs) There exists a club size s∗ with 1 ≤ s∗ < |D| such that
payoﬀs are increasing in club size up to club size s∗ and decreasing thereafter.
A-4 (free mobility) Each player can move freely and unilaterally from one club to
another. This means that a player can drop his membership in any given club
and join any other club without bargaining with or seeking the permission of
any player or group of players. Put diﬀerently, a player i can unilaterally change
his 1-arc from player node i to club node c to a 1-arc from player node i to
any other club node c . Moreover, any number of players acting unilaterally
and noncooperatively can change the existing or status quo club network by
switching their arcs (i.e., by switching their club memberships).
6.1.2 Preferences, Rules, and Dominance
Given club networks G0 and G1 in G, we say that players i ∈ S prefer G1 to G0,
denoted G0 ≺S G1,
if u(
   G2
0(i)
   ) <u (
   G2
1(i)
   ) for players i ∈ S.
We say that players i ∈ S can change G0 to G1, denoted G0 →S G1,i ft h em o v e
from G0 to G1 only involves a change in club memberships by players in S,l e a v i n g
unchanged the memberships of players outside group S,t h a ti s ,
if G0(i)=G1(i) for all players i ∈ N\S (i.e, i not contained in S).
Given these preferences and rules, we can equip the feasible set of club networks
with the indirect dominance relation || (i.e., >=||). Thus, club network G  ∈ G
indirectly dominates club network G ∈ G,t h a ti sG RR G , if there exists a ﬁnite
sequence of club networks, G0,...,G n in G,w i t hG := G0 and G  := Gn,a n da
corresponding sequence of groups of players, S1,...,S n, such that for k =1 ,2,...,n,
Gk−1 →Sk Gk and Gn  Sk Gk−1.
We can also equip the feasible set of club networks with the direct dominance
relation | (i.e., >=|). Thus, club network G  ∈ G directly dominates club network
G ∈ G,t h a ti sG R G ,i ff o rs o m eg r o u po fp l a y e r sS,
G →S G
 
and G
 
 S G.
31We will refer to the path dominance core with respect to indirect dominance as
the farsighted core and to the path dominance core with respect to direct dominance
as the direct core.
6.1.3 Nonemptiness of the Farsighted Core
If players are farsighted Page and Wooders (2006) show that under assumptions [A-
1]-[A-4],
if |C| ≥
|D|
s∗ and |D| = rs∗ + l for nonnegative integers r and l, l<s ∗,
then the farsighted core is nonempty if and only if l =0(i.e., if and only if there are
no left over players). Alternatively, if |C| <
|D|
s∗ , that is, if there are ‘too few’ club
locations, so that the average number of players per club is larger than the optimal
club size, Page and Wooders (2006) show that the farsighted core is nonempty if and
only if players can be divided into clubs of equal size.
6.1.4 Nonemptiness of the Direct Core
By contrast, if players are myopic Page and Wooders (2006) show that if |C| ≥
|D|
s∗ ,
then the direct core is nonempty, even if there are left over players (i.e., even if l>0),
if and only if players payoﬀsa r es u c ht h a tu(l) ≥ u(s∗ +1 )- i.e., if and only if the
payoﬀs to players in the left over club are greater than or equal to the payoﬀst h a t
would be generated if the left over players were to join clubs of optimal size (i.e.,
were to make optimal clubs overcrowded). Alternatively, they show that if |C| <
|D|
s∗ ,
that is, if there are ‘too few’ club locations, then the direct core is always nonempty.
Moreover, they show for the too-few-clubs case that a club network is in the direct
core if and only if the clubs induced by the network are as close in size as possible -
i.e., if and only if clubs diﬀer in size by at most one member.
6.2 Hedonic games
In the abstract game ( G,≥p) that we have considered, the set of outcomes G is a
set of networks. However, our main results, Theorems 1-4, hold for any ﬁnite set of
outcomes. With this in mind, consider the following hedonic eight-person game where
G consists of coalition structures (where each coalition structure is a partition of the
total player set) proposed to us by Salvador Barbera and Michael Maschler (2006).
A move from one coalition structure to another can be brought about by any group
of players defecting from the original structure, but unlike the club example above,
free entry is not assumed. The example illustrates that our framework encompasses
hedonic games and that the hedonic farsighted core is not necessarily equivalent to
the hedonic core.
Let the players be denoted by D = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}. Player preferences over
32coalitions is as follows:
player 1 (1,2,3,4) (1,2,3) (1,2) (1) ...
player 2 (1,2,3,4) (1,2,3) (1,2) (2) ...
player 3 (1,2,3,4) (3,4,5,6) (1,2,3) (3) (3,6)
player 4 (3,4,5,6) (1,2,3,4) (4,5) (4) ...
player 5 (3,4,5,6) (5,6,7,8) (4,5) (5) ...
player 6 (5,6,7,8) (3,4,5,6) (6,7,8) (6) (3,6)
player 7 (5,6,7,8) (6,7,8) (7,8) (7) ...
player 8 (5,6,7,8) (6,7,8) (7,8) (8) ...
Players’ Preferences Over Coalitions
Consider the row for player 1 in the table above. The interpretation is that 1 prefers
the coalition (1,2,3,4) to the coalition (1,2,3), to the coalition (1,2),a n ds oo n .
Player 1’s preferences over the remaining coalitions are irrelevant to the following
example so they are not speciﬁed. The same interpretation applies to the rows cor-
responding to other players.
A coalition structure is in the hedonic core if there does not exist a coalition
that is preferred by all its members to their coalitions of membership in the original
coalition structure. Consider the coalition structure ((1,2,3,4),(5,6,7,8)) ∈ G.T h i s
is a core point for the hedonic game because the only coalition that is preferred by
players 5 and 6 is (3,4,5,6) but two members of this coalition, 3 and 4,d on o tp r e f e r
it. If players 4 and 5 are farsighted, however, and domination is indirect, 4 and 5
can decide to form a coalition (4,5) - thus bringing about the coalition structure
((1,2,3),(4,5),(6,7,8)). Now players 3,4,5, and 6 could all beneﬁtf r o mf o r m i n ga
coalition. This brings us to the coalition structure ((1,2),(3,4,5,6),(7,8)) ah e d o n i c
core point in which 4 and 5 are better oﬀ than in the original hedonic core point.
But the story is not ﬁnished. Starting from ((1,2),(3,4,5,6),(7,8)),p l a y e r s3 and
6 can separate and form their own coalition. Using an argument similar to the one
above, this move by 3 and 6 can then lead back to the original coalition structure.
We see here that, even though the hedonic core is nonempty, the hedonic far-
sighted core is empty. (Note that, in contrast, if the path dominance core is deﬁned
with respect to direct dominance then the direct core is nonempty and is equivalent
to the hedonic core). Another point illustrated is that for path dominance, it is only
necessary that a coalition perceive some path that would lead to a preferred situa-
tion; it is not required that a coalition perceive some preferred ﬁnal (and presumably
stable) outcome. The example also suggests for those special cases of cooperative
games and hedonic games that if the core (or the hedonic core) is non-empty and not
a singleton, then the path dominance core with respect to indirect dominance (i.e.,
the farsighted core) is empty while the path dominance core with respect to direct
dominance (i.e., the direct core) is equivalent to the core of the hedonic game.
337C o n c l u s i o n s
From the viewpoint of the path dominance core with direct or indirect dominance,
there are a number of potential questions to be addressed. For example, what is the
relationship, if any, between basins of attraction and the path dominance core and
partnered (or separating) collections of coalitions, as in for example Page and Wooders
(1995), Reny and Wooders (1997) or Maschler and Peleg (1967) and Maschler, Peleg
and Shapley (1971)? Or what is relationship between basins of attraction and the
path dominance core and the inner core, as in Qin (1993,1994)?
To conclude, we return to the prior research introducing concepts similar to the ab-
stract game deﬁned in this paper and the union of basins of attractions; see Schwartz
(1974), Panzer, Kalai and Schmeidler (1976), Kalai and Schmeidler (1977) and Shenoy
(1980).26 For speciﬁcity, we focus on Kalai and Schmeidler (1977). These authors take
as given a set of feasible alternatives, denoted by S, a dominance relation, denoted by
M, and the transitive closure of M, denoted by   M. Their admissible set is the set
A(S,M): ={x ∈ S : y ∈ S and y  Mx imply x  My}.27 Besides non-emptiness of the
admissible set, they also shown that the admissible set is equal to the union of certain
subsets — in our terminology, basins of attraction. While Kalai and Schmeidler apply
their concept to cooperative games and games in normal (strategic) form, they do not
consider networks, the focus of our research. Once our model of network formation is
developed, then our abstract game is a particular case of the abstract game of these
earlier authors. Our contribution diﬀers in that we develop the network framework
and characterize several equilibrium concepts from network theory in terms of their
relationships to each other and to basins of attraction and the path dominance core.
In addition, we characterize the set of von-Neumann-Morgenstern solutions and the
path-dominance core (a case of the abstract core notion introduced in Gilles 1959) in
terms of their relationships to basins of attraction. It may well be that the insightful
examples developed by these authors will lead to new sorts of examples for networks,
a question we are currently addressing. Also, Kalai and Schmeidler (1977) allow an
inﬁnite set of possibilities, which, in a network framework, introduces a host of new
questions. We plan to address some of these in future research.
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